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Warrantless Wiretapping:
The Bush Administration's Failure to
Jam an Elephant into a Mousehole
by ADRIENNE RATNER*

[T]his concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end
in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power designed to
promote such a goal. Implicit in the term "national defense" is
the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this
Nation apart. For almost two centuries, our country has taken
singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its
Constitution.... It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of
national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of
those liberties ... which make the defense of the Nation
worthwhile.
ChiefJustice Earl Warren (1967)1

Introduction
In 2005, The New York Times revealed that the National Security
Agency ("NSA") had been illegally targeting hundreds of thousands
of domestic telephone and e-mail communications for surveillance
since 2002.2 Allegedly necessary in order to gather intelligence on al

* J.D. Candidate 2010, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
Special thanks to Professor Elizabeth Hillman, Matt Chayt, and Sarah Crespi for their
comments and inspiring discussions.
1. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
2. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al, available at www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/
16program/html?_r=l&pagewanted=all.
The day following the New York Times story, President George W. Bush confirmed the
existence of a "'terrorist surveillance program" in his weekly radio address: "In the weeks
following the [September 11, 2001] terrorist attacks on our Nation, I authorized the
National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the
international communications of people with known links to Al Qaeda and related
[167]
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Qaeda, this program of dragnet surveillance, authorized by President
George W. Bush without the consent of Congress and referred to as
the "terrorist surveillance program" ("TSP"), 3 circumvented the
Foreign Information Surveillance Act ("FISA"), which requires the
executive branch to obtain a judicial order prior to or within fifteen
days of initiating a wiretap.4 For four years, until The New York
Times revealed the warrantless wiretapping, President Bush
reauthorized the TSP every forty-five days at the recommendation of
the intelligence community and Department of Justice memoranda
On July 10, 2009, exactly one year after Congress authorized
FISA Amendments in 2008, the Inspectors General of five federal
security and intelligence agencies and the Department of Justice
released an unclassified report concluding that FISA's requirements
had not hindered intelligence gathering efforts.6 Nonetheless-in
fact, now with even more vigor-the Obama Administration
continues to support the Bush Administration's illegal, pointless
wiretapping program,7 which, though codified into law in 2008,

terrorist organizations. Before we intercept these communications, the Government must
have information that establishes a clear link to these terrorist networks." ACLU v. NSA,
493 F.3d 644, 648 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007).
3. The Inspectors General of the Justice Department, the Defense Department, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report on the President'sSurveillance Program,July
10, 2009, available at http://documents.nytimes.com/federal-report-on-the-president-ssurveillance-program#p=1 [hereinafter Surveillance Program Report].
4. 50 U.S.C. § 1811. "The President's authorization of the NSA program appeared to
contravene both FISA's criminal prohibition on statutorily unauthorized electronic
surveillance, and another statutory provision specifying that FISA's procedures are to be
the 'exclusive means' by which such surveillance can be lawfully performed for foreign
intelligence purposes. Senator Arlen Specter, chair of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, immediately questioned the legality of the program, and announced that his
committee would hold hearings on the issue early in the new year. The Bush
Administration responded with an aggressive public relations campaign .... David Cole
& Martin S. Lederman, The National Security Agency's Domestic Spying Program:
Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355, 1355 (2006).
5. Editorial, Illegal, and Pointless, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A22, available at
http:/lwww.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/opinion/17fril .html? r=3.
6. "Most [intelligence community] officials interviewed . .. had difficulty citing
specific instances where PSP reporting had directly contributed to counterterrorism
successes." Surveillance ProgramReport, supra note 3, at 40.
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Mohawk
Industries, Inc. v. Norman Carpenter, No. 08-678, pp. 28-32, available at http://www.
abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08678_RespondentAmCuUSA. pdf.
On
August 2, 2009, in a case largely about attorney client privilege, the Obama
Administration filed an amicus brief asserting the broad power of the state secrets power
to shut down lawsuits and arguing that the state secrets privilege was rooted in the
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remains unconstitutional. In the only federal lawsuit challenging the
legality of the TSP, the Obama Administration has argued that the
court should not review previously released documents that prove
illegal domestic surveillance.'
Furthermore, the Obama

Constitution. See also Editorial, Still Wrong on Wiretapping, S.F. CHRON., July 20, 2009,
at A10 Bob Egelko, Obama Goes to Bat for Bush Wiretap Program,S.F. CHRON., July 16,
2009, at A6 Adam Liptak, Obama Administration Weighs in on State Secrets, Raising
Concern on the Left, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at All
As a senator and presidential candidate, Barack Obama voted for FISA 2008. At
the time, Senator Obama expressed that he was unsatisfied with the immunity provision
and pledged he would "work to remove this provision so that we can seek full
accountability for past offenses."
Contrary to Presidential Candidate Obama's campaign statements, the Obama
Administration has tenaciously and rigorously defended the TSP and tried to prevent any
judicial ruling that the Bush Administration TSP was illegal: "President Obama has
refused to open a full investigation of the many laws that were evaded, twisted or broken
-pointlessly and destructively-under Mr. Bush. Mr. Obama should change his mind. A
full accounting is the only way to ensure these abuses never happen again." Editorial,
supra note 5.
8. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2008). On July 10, 2008, the United States Senate approved
by a landslide (69 to 28), and President Bush promptly signed into law, a bill amending the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to permit the government to conduct mass,
untargeted surveillance of all communications coming into and out of the United States
without any individualized review and without any finding of wrongdoing. Eric Lichtblau,
Senate Approves Bill to Broaden Wiretap Powers, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2008, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/l0/washington/l0fisa.html?partner=perma
link&exprod=permalink. In addition to permitting warrantless domestic wiretapping to
be conducted legally, the FISA 2008 Amendments grant immunity to telecommunications
companies and unspecified individuals who may have shared surveillance records with the
government at any point in the last seven years. The FISA Amendments of 2008
drastically alter the degree of scrutiny required for domestic electronic surveillance and
provide immunity to telecommunications companies that aid the government in
conducting electronic surveillance. For Fourth Amendment conflicts, see Legal History
and Review of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, http://www.cnss.org/fisa.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2009),
9. Glenn Greenwald, Obama's Efforts To Block a Judicial Ruling on Bush's Illegal
Eavesdropping, SALON, ,Feb. 28 2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/
2009/02/28/ alharamain/index.html ("As part of a criminal investigation against the AlHaramain Islamic Foundation, an Oregon-based charity, the Bush DOJ accidentally
turned over to the charity's lawyers a document showing that the Bush NSA eavesdropped
without warrants on conversations between the charity and its two lawyers, both U.S.
citizens. The charity and its lawyers then sued the Bush administration for illegally
eavesdropping on their communications. That document is what distinguished this case
from all other NSA cases, because it enables the plaintiffs (the charity and its lawyers) to
prove that they were subjected to Bush's illegal spying program and they therefore have
standing to sue ......
The Obama Administration seeks to block the court from
considering that document.) See also David Kravets, Appeals Court Allows Classified
Evidence in Spy Case, WIRED BLOG NETWORK, Feb. 27, 2009, http://blog.wired.com/
27bstroke6/2009/02/appeals-court-a.html; see also David Kravets, Obama Administration:
Constitution Does Not Protect Cell-Site Records, WIRED BLOG NETWORK, Mar. 17, 2009,
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Administration has gone even further than the Bush Administration

in its assertion of the state secret doctrine, suggesting that it might use
the power of state secrets to shut down lawsuits regarding the
constitutionality of warrantless wiretapping.'"
Prior to the 2008 amendments, FISA allowed unfettered

electronic surveillance of communications abroad but restricted the
executive branch's power to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance on communications within the United States by requiring
that a court find probable cause to believe that the target of the
surveillance was an agent of a foreign power." In defense of domestic
warrantless wiretapping, the Bush Administration initially argued
that it did not violate FISA because a post-September 11

Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF") 12 superseded, or
impliedly repealed, existing limitations on electronic surveillance
found in FISA.'3

Later, the Bush Administration argued that the

post-September 11 AUMF must be construed so as to empower the
President, as Commander in Chief, to authorize surveillance without
court approval or, at least, to ignore FISA's prohibitions.' The Bush
available
at
http://www.nwotruth.com/obama-administration-constitution-does-notprotect-cell-site-records/.
10. Brief for the United States, supra note 7.
11. FISA permits domestic electronic surveillance to be initiated before court
approval so long as approval is sought within seventy-two hours. It also permits domestic
electronic surveillance without court approval during the first fifteen days of a war, and
allows for Congress to consider proposals for wartime statutory amendments. Id. "FISA
is inapplicable to surveillance of communications collected outside the United States and
not targeted at U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens (collectively referred to as "U.S.
persons") within the United States. See 50 U.S.C. 1801(f)(1)-(2) (defining "electronic
surveillance"). Thus, FISA does not impose any limits on wiretapping of calls between
foreign nationals outside the United States-whether or not they are associated with al
Qaeda-and persons within the United States, as long as the calls are not intercepted
domestically, and the tap is not 'targeted' at a U.S. person within the country." Cole &
Lederman, supra note 4, at 1356 n.5.
12. Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong.
(2001) (enacted).
13. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Affairs and U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Sen. Pat Roberts et al., Senate Select Comm. on
Intelligence and House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, (Dec. 22, 2005),
reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1360 (2006) [hereinafter DOJ White Paper, Dec. 22, 2005] ("The
President stated that these activities are 'crucial to our national security."').
14. Id. See also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb-Framingthe Problem, Doctrine, and OriginalUnderstanding,121 HARV.
L. REV. 689, 710 (2008) ("'On the most extreme versions of this view, Congress cannot
limit [the President's power to engage in international electronic surveillance] even if it
chooses to do so. Foreign surveillance is a presidential prerogative, akin to dictation of
the movement of troops .... ' (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and
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Administration further argued that the TSP was narrowly targeted
and therefore all surveillance conducted as part of the TSP would
have survived the probable cause standard had it been applied.15
Essentially, even if the Bush Administration had flouted an act of
Congress and circumvented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
16
Court, it still had not violated any persons' constitutional rights.
Each of these arguments is post hoc and construed to maximize
the power of the executive. 7 The Bush Administration attempted to
justify its actions with the sense of exigency that existed postSeptember 11,8 but the history of FISA and the clarity of the statute
show that Congress intended to prevent precisely the type of
surveillance carried out under the TSP. The Supreme Court
articulated in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer 9 and
subsequent cases that the Commander in Chief does not have
authority to flout an act of Congress. Furthermore, the TSP violated
Fourth Amendment rights Congress originally intended FISA to
safeguard. The Supreme Court and Congress had anticipated and
intentionally prescribed checks on the executive branch's power for
situations of national crisis and threats to national security, such as
the September 11 terrorist attack.

National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 38-39 (2006))). See also
Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Affairs and
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, (Mar. 24, 2006) available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj032406.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Moschella to
the Honorable Sensenbrenner (Mar. 24, 2006)], ("The President has inherent
constitutional authority over the gathering of foreign intelligence-authority that
Congress may not circumscribe.").
15. Letter from Moschella to the Honorable Sensenbrenner (Mar. 24, 2006), supra
note 14, at 7. Barron & Lederman, supra note 14, at 711 n.65.
16. Id.
17. Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the
Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006),
reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1375, 1401-02 (2006) [hereinafter DOJ White Paper, Jan. 19,
20061.
18. DOJ White Paper, Dec. 22, 2005, supra note 13, at 1363 ("The President stated
that these activities are "'crucial to our national security."'). See also Memorandum from
John C. Yoo to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel for the President, (Oct. 23, 2001), available
at http://www.salon.com/opinionlgreenwald/2009/03/03/yoo/index.html.
19. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643-47 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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Courts are presently considering the constitutionality of the
TSP, 0 and President Obama is presently under pressure to keep his
promise to protect civil liberties.21 This paper will argue that the
potential national security benefits of warrantless domestic
wiretapping are insufficient to justify its gross compromise of civil
liberties and, moreover, that it was unconstitutional for President
Bush to authorize the TSP because he flagrantly abused the power
vested in him as Commander in Chief and directly flouted
Congressional intent.
I.

The Commander in Chief Does Not Have Authority To
Flout an Act of Congress
In the days after September 11, instead of going to an amenable
Congress to extend his eavesdropping powers, the President decided
to exert executive power and authorize the TSP. By doing so, he
went beyond his constitutional authority.22
The DOJ attempted to justify the President's actions by arguing
the overall superintendence of the Commander in Chief: that the
Commander in Chief has indefeasible authority to control the
conduct of war once it is underway (preclusive of the exercise of
Congress's Article I powers) or, in the alternative, that the President
has a constitutional duty to respond to an unforeseen attack with
whatever means necessary." The DOJ is wrong that the Commander
in Chief Clause gives the President preclusive power. Even during
wartime, the President is accountable to Congress, and executive
actions that violate express or implied statutory limitations are
invalid. Furthermore, and contrary to the government's Youngstown
analysis, the AUMF did not place the President at the height of his
authority.

20. Glenn Greenwald, Today's FISA Ruling: A Case Study in 8 Years of Lying and
Ignorance, SALON, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/ 2009/01/15/

fisa/index.html (discussing the FISA Court's ruling on whether the Protect America Act is
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment).
21.

Glenn

Greenwald,

Keith

Olbermann's Scathing

Criticism

of

Obama's

Secrecy/Immunity Claims, SALON, Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/
2009/04/08/criticism/index.html; McJoan, More Immunity Claims on Wiretapping from
Obama DOJ, DAILY Kos, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/4/7/
717546/-More-Immunity-Claims-on-Wiretapping-from-Obama-DOJ.
22. Id. at 279, 284, 290.
23. DOJ White Paper, Jan. 19, 2006, supra note 17. See also Barron & Lederman,
supra note 14, at 694, 704-05, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU

GHRAIB 13 (Karen J. Greenburg & Joshua A. Dratel eds., 2005)).
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A. The Commander in Chief Clause Prescribes Limited Power
The Commander in Chief Clause reads:
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;
he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer
in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating
to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have
Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses
against the
24
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
According to the DOJ, any powers granted by Article II,
including the Commander in Chief Clause, must also be immune from
statutory limitation.25 FISA, therefore, could not encroach on the
President's power.
But although the President might enjoy a
particular power, it does not mean that statutes cannot temper his
exercise of that power.26
The historical record is scant and ambiguous as to the degree of
power vested in the President through Commander in Chief Clause.
While the DOJ argues that the Constitution and the Framers' intent
was to vest in the President broad, almost infinite, powers supreme
over Congress',27 there is evidence that the Framers viewed the
Commander in Chief's power narrowly." In The FederalistNo. 69,
Hamilton described the Commander in Chief Clause as inferior to
that of the British Crown: "It would amount to nothing more than the
supreme command and direction of the military.., while that of the
British King extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising and
regulating of fleets and armies., 29 Hamilton's comparison suggests
that the power vested in the Commander in Chief to conduct military
campaigns is not beyond legislative control.3"
Scholars Barron and Lederman argue that no post-Founding
historical consensus has ever developed among the political branches

24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.

25. Barron & Lederman, supra note 14, at 741.
26. Id. at 742.
27. Memorandum from John C. Yoo to Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 18, at 6.
28.

STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 557, at

23 (2007).

29. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.69, at 418 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., Penguin Group Inc. 1961) (1788)).
30. Barron & Lederman, supra note 14, at 696.
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in favor of the Commander in Chief's preclusive power over the
conduct of campaigns during wartime. 3' Rather than interpret the
Commander in Chief Clause, the Court has grounded its war powers
decisions largely in statutory interpretations. In the seminal case
regarding statutory limits on the President's war powers of Little v.
Barreme, the Court considered the liability of Captain Little, who
captured a suspected American ship sailing from a French port during
"the hostilities between the United States and France."32 Captain
Little had captured the ship according to President Adams' executive
order to seize ships sailing or bound to or from French ports, but
Congress had passed an act only authorizing the Navy to seize
American ships that appear to be bound or sailing to any port or
place within France.33 The Court held that because the President's
order exceeded the authority extended by legislative action, the
Captain would face liability.' In other words, when Congress has
prescribed the manner in which its authorization for the use of armed
force is to be executed, its prescription is binding even on the
President.35
From the time of that decision up to 1950, Congress enacted
regulations of the President's authority in every area, and the
executive accepted those regulations without constitutional
36 Contrary to the DOJ's argument, the historical record
challenge.
does not support the idea of preclusive Article II powers for the
Commander in Chief; the Commander in Chief is still accountable to
Congress and must respect statutory limitations.
Since 1950, Congress has enacted restrictions too often, and
Presidents have challenged their legality too infrequently for anything

31. Id. at 697.
32. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804).
33. Id. at 170.
34. Id. at 179.
35. Because this case is entirely about the President flouting the act of Congress and
the language of the executive order as compared to the act of Congress, I reject the
reading that this case should be read narrowly regarding the liability of military
subordinates or that the Court never reached the question of the President's inherent
constitutional authority to go beyond Congress' commands. See John. C. Yoo, The
Continuation of Politics By Other Means: The Original Understandingof War Powers, 84
CAL. L. REV. 167, 294-95 n.584 (1996) (arguing that Little v. Barreme did not call upon the
United States Supreme Court to settle an inter-branch war dispute, but instead the Court
resolved the issue by deferring to Congress' legislative power concerning captures on
water).
36. Barron & Lederman, supra note 14, at 697.
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like a tradition of preclusive power to have taken root. The executive
has consistently read statutes in such a way that "interpret[s] away the
legislative constraint, leaving it to Congress to respond by attempting
to impose (or re-impose)
the constraint, but this time with
37
clarity.
unmistakable
Meanwhile in 1952, the Supreme Court in Youngstown held that
even during wartime, the Executive's actions are invalid when they
violate express or implied statutory limitations.38
The Court
invalidated the President's seizure of the steel mills during the
Korean War because Congress had previously rejected an
amendment that "would have authorized such governmental seizures
in cases of emergency."39 The Youngstown Court took a restrained
view of the President's authority during wartime, contrasting the
government's view of the executive with the forefathers' experience
with King George III, which surely inspired a negative impression of
an all-powerful executive. °
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion further articulates the
Court's view on the executive branch's interdependence with the
other branches. Reading the Commander in Chief Clause against the
historical backdrop of the Revolutionary War and the Third
Amendment, Justice Jackson rejected the government's argument
that the Clause gave the President unchecked military authority:
Just what authority goes with the name [Commander in
Chief] has plagued presidential advisors who would not waive
or narrow it by nonassertion yet cannot say where it begins or
ends.... Hence, this loose appellation is sometimes advanced
as support for any presidential action, internal or external,
involving use of force, the idea being that it vests power to do
anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or navy....
[But] [t]here are indications that the Constitution did not
contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the
country, its industries and its inhabitants. He has no monopoly
of 'war powers,' whatever they are.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 697, 715-16.
Id. at 702-03.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952).
Id. at 641 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 641-44 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Justice Jackson further articulated that the President's authority
as Commander in Chief was specifically limited in the area of
domestic affairs: "That military powers of the Commander in Chief
were not to supersede representative government of internal affairs
seems obvious from the Constitution and from elementary American
history."42 Moreover, the Court articulated that the system of checks
and balances must be upheld whatever the topic and issue at stake:
Today a kindly President uses the seizure power to effect a
wage increase and to keep the steel furnaces in production. Yet
tomorrow another President might use the same power to
prevent a wage increase, to curb trade-unionists, to regiment
labor as oppressively as industry thinks it has been regimented
by this seizure.
More recently, in Hamdi, the Court reiterated its intent to
restrain executive authority, holding:
We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank
check for the president when it comes to the rights of the
Nation's citizens.... Whatever power the United States
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges
with.., enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual
liberties are at stake.44
Contrary to the DOJ's argument, the Court has not consistently
held that the Commander in Chief's powers are immune from
statutory limitation: in Youngstown, and in Hamdi, the Court clearly
intended to delineate executive authority in a way that was
autonomous, and yet interdependent and reciprocal with the other
branches of government. 45 The Court does not always give deference
to the Executive. Like the seizure of steel mills at issue in
Youngstown, the President's authorization of the TSP violates express
limitations, and is therefore invalid.

42. Id. at 644 (Jackson, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
45. See id. at 536; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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B.

The Commander in Chief Clause Does Not Give the Executive
Authority to Conduct Warrantless Domestic Wiretapping During
Wartime
In Justice Jackson's famous and widely cited concurring opinion
in Youngstown, he articulated a measure by which the Court could
determine whether the President had authority to act autonomously:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon
his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb ....Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control
in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon
the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive
and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system.46

The Youngstown Court invalidated President Truman's
authorization to seize the steel mills because Congress had failed to
give the President the authority in question.
Whereas President Truman had acted in the absence of
congressional authority, or possibly incompatibly with Congress's
implied will, President Bush's authorization of the TSP was
incompatible with an express will of Congress. Congress had
expressly prohibited the President from conducting domestic
warrantless wiretapping. 47 "And it did so in the strongest way
possible, by making the conduct a crime."' Congress had extensively
grappled with the constitutional question in the legislative process
and had crafted the statute specifically in order to preclude the

46. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-39.
47. The NationalSecurity Agency's Domestic Spying Program:February2, 2006 Letter
from Scholars and Former Government Officials to CongressionalLeadership in Response
to Justice DepartmentWhite Paper of January 19, 2006, reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1415, 1419

(2006) [hereinafter February2, 2006 Letter from Scholars].
48. Id.
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President from invoking a constitutional authority to 49 engage in
electronic surveillance outside the means FISA prescribes.
The DOJ attempted to apply Youngstown to the TSP, arguing
that the President acted at the height of his authority since his actions
were in accordance with the AUMF, ° in spite of the fact that they
were in contradiction to FISA, a long-standing, much-deliberated act
of Congress. According to the DOJ, "the AUMF place[d] the
President at the zenith of his powers" under the tripartite framework51
of executive authority the Supreme Court set forth in Youngstown.
Since the AUMEF granted broad authorization to the President to act
as the Commander in Chief, "the President's power in authorizing the
NSA activities [was] at its height because he acted 'pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress,' and his power
'include[d] all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate.' 52 Furthermore, the DOJ argued that the AUMF, as
construed by Hamdi, authorized the President to "take actions
against al Qaeda and related organizations that amount to
'fundamental incident[s] of waging war,' and therefore also
authorized the President to conduct warrantless domestic
wiretapping, since intercepting enemy communications had long been
recognized as a fundamental incident of the use of military force.53
The DOJ clearly misapplied Youngstown: the DOJ misconstrued
the intent and the resulting law from Youngstown and is wrong in its
assertion that the president acted at the height of his powers.
Nothing in the AUMF or in the way that any AUMF has ever been
upheld gives the President immunity from violating statutes; the DOJ
was overbold and wrong in arguing that the President acted at the
height of his authority.54

49. Id.
50. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Sen. Pat Roberts et al., 1 (Dec. 22, 2005), reprinted in 81
IND. L.J. 1360, 1362 (2006).
51. DOJ White Paper, Jan, 19, 2006, supra note 17, at 1375 (citing Youngstown, 343
U.S. at 635 -39 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
52. Id. (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635).
53. Id. at 1386 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality
opinion)).
54. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 652-53, 716-17 (6th Cir. 2007). Lower courts
have held that the DOJ's AUMF and inherent presidential authority arguments are weak.
Although the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, by a 2-1 decision, vacated a district court
order which enjoined the Bush Administration from eavesdropping without warrants, it
did so on the basis of standing and did not reach the question of the constitutionality of
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II. The AUMF Does Not Authorize
Domestic Electronic Surveillance
The statutory language, legislative history, and judicial record
make it clear that Congress intended FISA and the criminal code to
be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance is to be
conducted.55 FISA explicitly prohibits surveillance authorized by
statute and makes an emergency provision allowing the President to
engage in warrantless domestic electronic surveillance for fifteen days
immediately following a Congressional declaration of war. The DOJ
has read these provisions of FISA extremely narrowly in attempt to
argue that the statute permits the President, as Commander in Chief,
to generally conduct domestic electronic surveillance without a
warrant and obtain Congressional approval post hoc. 6 Furthermore,
the DOJ has read Congressional intent very conservatively,
proclaiming that although Congress limited executive power to
conduct domestic surveillance, Congress did so cautiously and with
great deference to the executive branch; "Congress did not attempt
through FISA to prohibit the Executive Branch from using electronic
surveillance. Instead, Congress acted to bring the exercise of that
power under more stringent congressional control. 57 The DOJ
minimized a vast legislative history, characterizing FISA as hasty and
marginal: "Congress understood it was legislating on fragile
constitutional ground and was pressing or even exceeding
constitutional limits in regulating the President's authority in the field
of foreign intelligence."58' The DOJ further concluded that since the
legislature provided for a modicum of discretion to exercise executive
authority to conduct electronic surveillance for a brief period

the TSP. In a separate opinion, one of the three judges, Judge Gilman, reiterated the
district judge's holding that the TSP program violated FISA, and that enactment of the
AUMF did not alter that result. He also held that FISA was constitutional as applied to
the TSP and that the President did not have an Article II power to disregard the statute,

citing the Jackson concurrence in Youngstown, that the President's Commander in Chief
authority was at its "lowest ebb" on the issue of domestic warrantless wiretapping. Glenn
Greenwald, Yesterday's Ruling on NSA Warrantless Eavesdropping, SALON, Jul. 7, 2007,

http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/07/07/nsa/;

Marty Lederman, The Sixth

Circuit Opinions in the TSP/FISA Case (Jul. 6, 2007), http://balkin.blogspot.com/

2007/07/sixth-circuit-opinion-in-tspfisa-case.html, citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-39.
55.

note 47,
56.
57.
58.

18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2008). See also February2, 2006 Letter from Scholars, supra

at 1417.
DOJ White Paper, Jan. 19, 2006, supra note 17, at 1393-94.
Id. at 1393.
Id. at 1392.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 37:1

immediately following declaration of war, the AUMF must have been

sufficient to extend that authority indefinitely and in the place of a
judicial warrant. 9
But in contrast to the DOJ's claims, as will be shown below, the
history and statutory language of FISA clearly support strong judicial

and Congressional intent to limit the authority of the executive to
conduct warrantless domestic wiretapping.
A. Courts Explicitly Intended To Limit Executive Power To Wiretap
Within the Context of Heightened National Security Concerns.
The

national

security crisis

post-September

11

and

the

heightened call for surveillance was precisely the type of situation to
which the Supreme Court intended for judicial review to apply when
it held that warrants were constitutionally required for all domestic
surveillance, electronic and otherwise. 06 In 1967, the Supreme Court
rejected the government's argument that Fourth Amendment
requirements should be relaxed in order to fight organized crime.6'

Shortly thereafter, the exposure of President Nixon's improper use of
federal resources to spy on political and activist groups and the

government's extensive electronic surveillance against the antiVietnam War movement and the Black Power movement led to a
court challenge to electronic surveillance conducted for "domestic
security" purposes.62 In United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), the

Court considered the constitutionality of warrantless electronic
surveillance of three citizens who were allegedly conspiring to bomb a
CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 6

The Court rejected the

government's arguments that un-reviewed surveillance had been

59. Id. at 1393-94, 1396.
60. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972). See also
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967) (holding that a New York statute
authorizing electronic surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment because: (1) "it did
not requir[e] the belief that any particular offense has been or is being committed; nor that
the 'property' sought, the conversations, be particularly described"; (2) it failed to limit the
duration of the surveillance to impose sufficiently stringent requirements on renewals of
the authorization; and (3) the statute "has no requirement for notice as do conventional
warrants, nor does it overcome this defect by requiring some showing of special facts");
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967) (holding that a warrant was required
regardless of the purpose of the search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)
(holding that Fourth Amendment's probable cause and warrant requirements apply to
electronic surveillance).
61. Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-60.
62. Keith, 407 U.S. at 299.
63. Id.
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necessary in light of domestic threats to national security. ' The Court
expressed that in national security crises, that although the
investigative duty of the executive may be stronger, there is also
greater jeopardy for constitutionally protected speech.
The danger of political dissent is acute where the
Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the
power to protect "domestic security." . . The historical
judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures
to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential
invasions of privacy and protected speech. 66
Weighing the asserted government need for collecting and
maintaining intelligence against Fourth Amendment protections, the
Court unanimously held that domestic warrantless surveillance was
unconstitutional and concluded that prior warrants would be required
for domestic surveillance.67
The Court left open the question of foreign intelligence
gathering and held warrantless surveillance was constitutional where
foreign powers are involved.68 Following Keith, several lower courts
held that warrantless foreign electronic surveillance was
constitutional, but in 1975, the D.C. Circuit held that warrantless
surveillance of the Jewish Defense League ("JDL") was
unconstitutional because the JDL was not a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power. 69 The circuit court articulated that its

64. Id. at 320-21. The Court recognized the executive branch's interest in protecting
national security and the value of electronic surveillance in detecting security threats, but
nonetheless held that the decision to conduct electronic surveillance cannot be left to the
discretion of law enforcement officials. Id. The Court rejected the executive branch's
arguments that "internal security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial
evaluation" and that "prior judicial approval will fracture the secrecy essential to official
intelligence gathering." Id. The Court also rejected the executive branch's argument that
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement should be recognized for
domestic security surveillance. Id.
65. Id. at 314, 317.
66. Id. at 314.
67. Id. at 322-24.
68. Id. at 321-22.
69. William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism: The Intelligence/Law
Enforcement Dilemma-A History, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1099, 1110 (2007) (citing
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) ("[A] warrant must be
obtained before a wiretap is installed on a domestic organization that is neither the agent
of nor acting in collaboration with a foreign power, even if the surveillance is installed
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decision was in no way meant to restrict legitimate surveillance of
organizations that posed a threat to the United States, and that the
determination of necessity must be made by a neutral, disinterested
magistrate or judge-not by an executive official with investigative
and prosecutorial interests.7'
The Court articulated the need to uphold Fourth Amendment
protections for electronic surveillance in response to a political

climate and executive arguments very similar to national security
interests post-September 11.7 The judiciary was clear that even in a
climate of threats to national security, the Fourth Amendment
required an independent oversight of the executive's intelligence
gathering.
B.

Congress Explicitly Intended To Limit Executive Power To Wiretap
Within the Context of Heightened National Security Concerns.

The Court's holding in Keith that Fourth Amendment
protections must apply to electronic surveillance formed the basis for
Congress to draft and pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act a
few years later.72
In Keith, the Supreme Court rejected the

government's argument that surveillance conducted without prior
judicial approval was a lawful and reasonable exercise of the
President's power to protect national security. 7 The Court held

"Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if
domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the
under presidential directive in the name of foreign intelligence gathering for protection of
the national security ....
[Olur decision does not limit in any way the ability of the
President to conduct legitimate national security wiretaps, since we do not address the
substantive scope of that power or the exact standards upon which warrants should issue.
Rather, we merely decide that whatever the legitimate scope of [executive branch] power,
and whatever the standard which must be met to justify the intrusion of a wiretap, the
decision as to whether the scope has been exceeded or the standard has been met is to be
made by a neutral and disinterested magistrate or judge rather than by an Executive
official engaged in investigatory or prosecutorial duties, at least in situations where the
subject of the surveillance is a domestic organization that is not the agent of or acting in
collaboration with a foreign power.")).
70. Zweibon, 516 F.2d at 614.
71. Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1038 (D. Or. 2007).
72. Cole & Lederman, supra note 4, at 1355.
73. Keith, 407 U.S. at 301, 314, 312-13 ("There is understandably, a deep-seated
uneasiness and apprehension that this [electronic surveillance] capability will be used to
intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. We look to the Bill of Rights to
safeguard this privacy. Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private
speech from unreasonable surveillance.").
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discretion of the Executive Branch," and required the executive
branch to make application to a federal judge and show probable
cause before conducting domestic electronic surveillance."
Four years after Keith, a Senate Committee on intelligence
activities, known as the Church Committee, detailed widespread
warrantless surveillance, including politically motivated intelligence
files kept by the CIA, the FBI, the United States Army, and the
Internal Revenue Service.75 Under public pressure to respond to and
prevent future excesses of government surveillance, Congress passed
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978. While the Court
circumscribed the executive branch's power to conduct warrantless
surveillance, the press exposed further intelligence agency abuses,
including NSA surveillance of Americans and drug traffickers, U.S.
Army military intelligence surveillance of domestic groups, and CIA
opening of domestic mail sent to or received from abroad, all of
which increased public pressure on Congress.76 Meanwhile, the
executive branch sought to preserve its powers to conduct
surveillance, and so for the first time it seemed possible that a bill
regarding electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
74. Id. at 316-17.
75. United States Senate Select Comm. to Study Gov't Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities, Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book 2: Intelligence Activities and the
Rights of Americans, S. REP. No. 94-755, pt. 2, at 6-7 (1976). The Church Committee
detailed some of the revelations of illegal spying and other activities by U.S. intelligence
agencies.
FBI headquarters alone has developed over 500,000 domestic intelligence files,
and these have been augmented by additional files at FBI Field Offices. The FBI
opened 65,000 of these domestic intelligence files in 1972 alone .... The number
of Americans and domestic groups caught in the domestic intelligence net is
further illustrated by the following statistics: Nearly a quarter of a million first
class letters were opened and photographed in the United States by the CIA
between 1953-1973, producing a CIA computerized index of nearly one and onehalf million names. .

.

. Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA

computer system and separate files were created on approximately 7,200
Americans and over 100 domestic groups during the course of CIA Operation
CHAOS (1967-1973) .... An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subject of
United States Army intelligence files created between the mid-1960's and 1971.
Intelligence files on more than 11,000 individuals and groups were created by the
Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax investigations were
started on the basis of political rather than tax criteria. At least 26,000
individuals were at one point catalogued on an FBI list of persons to be rounded
up in the event of a 'national emergency.'
Id.
76. William Funk, supra note 69, at 1110.
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7

could overcome presidential veto. Senator Edward Kennedy and
Attorney General Edward Levi created FISA as a middle path. 8
FISA prescribed procedures for physical and electronic
surveillance and the collection of foreign intelligence information
where the Fourth Amendment had previously provided very general
limitations.7 9 FISA limited government surveillance to phone calls
(and subsequently e-mail communications) on foreign soil or coming
into the United States." The NSA could target phone and email
messages within the United States only if the NSA first obtained a
court order from the specially established FISC, which holds closed
sessions at the Justice Department.8
Congress intended, and FISA spelled out, that a court order must
be required for any domestic electronic surveillance. An application
for a judicial order certifying electronic surveillance of a foreign
power or agent of a foreign power must "certify that the purpose of
the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information."82
Congress explained that the intent behind this requirement was "to
prevent the practice of targeting one individual for electronic
surveillance when the true purpose of surveillance is to gather

77. Id. at 1111.
78. As passed, FISA authorized electronic surveillance of a foreign power or agent of
a foreign power to obtain intelligence information if either (1) the Attorney General
certified under oath that the surveillance was solely directed at communications
transmitted exclusively between certain "foreign powers" and the surveillance was one
that was not intended to and was unlikely to obtain communications of a "United States
person," in which case the Attorney General could authorize surveillance for up to one
year; or (2) the Attorney General submitted an application to the FISC containing
information about the identity, place, and justification for surveillance, and specifically
certifying that the purpose was for intelligence gathering, that information sough is foreign
intelligence information, and that the information could not reasonably be obtained
through normal means. Id. at 1112-15.
79. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2008), imposed the first
obstacles to electronic surveillance, making it a crime for any person to "intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the . . . contents" of wire and radio
communications. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2008). Prior to 1967, electronic surveillance by itself
was not considered a "'search"' under the Fourth Amendment because such surveillance
was conducted merely for intelligence purposes. The Supreme Court had interpreted this
provision as applying to the government and consequently held that evidence so obtained
was not admissible in court but permitted intelligences surveillance to continue so long as
the contents were not divulged nor published. Funk, supra note 69, at 1103-04. See also
DONALD

J.

MUSCH,

CIVIL

LIBERTIES

AND

THE

FOREIGN

INTELLIGENCE

SURVEILLANCE ACT 157,7 (2003).
80. Funk, supra note 69 at 1113-14.
81. 50 U.S.C. 1801(f)(1)-(2); see also James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, supra note 2.
82. Funk, supra note 69, at 1115.
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information about another individual... and to make explicit that the
sole purpose of such surveillance is to secure foreign intelligence
'
information and not to obtain information for any other purpose."83
Through FISA, Congress restrained the power of the executive
to gather information in a dragnet fashion as a means for initiating
criminal prosecutions.
Traditionally, intelligence operations
undertaken by the CIA and military intelligence agencies simply to
obtain information on the intentions, capabilities, and activities of
those able to harm the United States, are separated from gathering
information usually unrelated to criminal activity that might be
prosecuted.84 In passing FISA, Congress recognized the distinction
between intelligence gathering and criminal prosecutions, but in no
way attempted to create a barrier to sharing information.85 One of the
drafters of the original FISA, William Funk, writes, "It is clear that
this language was never intended to preclude the dissemination and
use of foreign intelligence information for law enforcement purposes,
so long as the purpose of the surveillance was to acquire foreign
intelligence information."' 86
Nevertheless, during the 1990s, the Department of Justice Office
of Intelligence Policy and Review and later the FISC itself instituted
rules effectively cutting off communications between FBI intelligence
personnel and the Criminal Division.
This misconception-or
misrepresentation-about FISA's limitations led to efforts to
circumvent and reform FISA post-September 11, 2001.88 As originally

intended, FISA placed little constraint on consultation and
coordination between agencies and no limitation on the use of
information
in criminal
trials; but multiple
presidential

administrations-especially the Bush Administration-interpreted
FISA as imposing limitations and used that as justification to
convince Congress and the public that security was compromised as a
result.8 9

The legislative history of FISA expressly declares Congress's
intent for FISA to be the exclusive source of executive branch power

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1138.
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to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence information,
and for the executive branch's power to be checked by the judiciary. 90
Congress clearly intended FISA to apply even during wartime and
explicitly limited the President's authority to authorize electronic
surveillance without a court order to a period not to exceed fifteen
calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress. 9
Courts have continued to hold that when Congress passed FISA,
Congress intended strong protections from warrantless domestic
wiretapping. 9 In 2008, a district court held:
The impetus for the enactment of FISA was Congressional
concern about warrantless wiretapping of United States citizens
conducted under a justification of inherent presidential
authority under Article II. Congress squarely challenged and
explicitly sought to prohibit warrantless wiretapping by the

90. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1,at 24 (1978) ("Even if the President has the inherent
authority in the absence of legislation to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance for
foreign intelligence purposes, Congress has the power to regulate the conduct of such
surveillance by legislating a reasonable procedure, which then becomes the exclusive
means by which such surveillance may be conducted."); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-1283,
pt. 2, at 101 (1978) ("Despite any inherent power of the President to authorize warrantless
electronic surveillances in the absence of legislation, by this bill [and Title III] ....
Congress will have legislated with regard to electronic surveillance in the United States,
that legislation with its procedures and safeguards prohibit the President, notwithstanding
any inherent powers, from violating the terms of that legislation.").
91. 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2008).
92. In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1122-23 (N.D. Cal.
2008) ("In the case of FISA, Congress attempted not only to put a stop to warrantless
wiretapping by the executive branch but also to establish checks and balances involving
other branches of government in anticipation of efforts by future, administrations to
undertake warrantless surveillance in some other manner: 'In the past several years,
abuses of domestic national security surveillances have been disclosed. This evidence
alone should demonstrate the inappropriateness of relying solely on executive branch
discretion to safeguard civil liberties. This committee is well aware of the substantial
safeguards respecting foreign intelligence electronic surveillance currently embodied in
classified Attorney General procedures, but this committee is also aware that over the past
thirty years there have been significant changes in internal executive branch procedures,
and there is ample precedent for later administrations or even the same administration
loosening previous standards.' Given the possibility that the executive branch might again
engage in warrantless surveillance and then assert national security secrecy in order to
mask its conduct, Congress intended for the executive branch to relinquish its near-total
control over whether the fact of unlawful surveillance could be protected as a secret."
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 21 (1978))). See also Mayfield v. United States,
504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1038 (D. Or. 2007) (on appeal).
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executive branch by means of FISA, as FISA's legislative
history amply documented. 93

The fact that post-September 11, 2001, was precisely the type of
situation Keith contemplated and which prompted Congress to pass
limits on domestic surveillance makes the TSP a complete flouting of
Congress's authority and its purpose behind FISA.
C. The Authorization for Use of Military Force Could Not Have
Impliedly Repealed Strong Legislative and Judicial Intent

The government's argument that a post-September 11 AUMF
impliedly repealed existing limitations on electronic surveillance
found in FISA 4 flies in the face of a clearly written statute and this
strong judicial and legislative history. As recently as 2006, the
Department of Justice argued:
In the specific context of the current armed conflict with al
Qaeda and related terrorist organizations, Congress by statute
has confirmed and supplemented the President's recognized
authority under Article II of the Constitution to conduct such
warrantless surveillance to prevent further catastrophic attacks
on the homeland. In its first legislative response to the terrorist
attacks of September 11th, Congress authorized the President

93. In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (holding that the
court must recognize Congress' intent for judicial review to apply to the executive). This
result is distinguished from Franklin v Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) where
the Court held that the Office of the President was not an executive "agency" whose
actions were subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act.
94. David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National Security Agency's Domestic
Spying Program: Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security
Agency Described by the President,reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1374, at 1409 n.21 (2005). See
also Cole & Lederman, supra note 4, at 1358 n.11. "The Times report was based on leaks
of classified information, presumably by NSA officials concerned about the legality of the
program. The Times reported that at the President's request it had delayed publication of
the story for more than a year." Id. at 1355. Following the New York Times story, in
December of 2005, the Administration set forth its legal defense of the NSA program in a
letter from the Department of Justice (DOJ) addressed to the leaders of the Senate and
House Intelligence Committees; "Most prominently, DOJ argued that Congress had
implicitly authorized the NSA's warrantless surveillance program when it authorized the
use of military force against al Qaeda in September 2001. More obliquely, the DOJ
suggested that to interpret the 2001 force authorization statute as not authorizing the NSA
program would raise a serious constitutional question, because in that case FISA's
prohibition of the surveillance would interfere with the President's authority as
commander in chief to execute the war against al Qaeda in the manner he thought most
effective. Finally, the letter argued that the wiretapping program does not violate the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1357.
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to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" of
September 11th in order to prevent "any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States." History
conclusively demonstrates that warrantless communications
intelligence targeted at the enemy in time of armed conflict is a
traditional and fundamental incident of the use of military force
authorized by the AUMF.95
In making the argument that the AUMF implicitly authorized
the executive to circumvent FISA, the DOJ relied on the thenrecently issued Supreme Court decision Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. 96 The
DOJ argued that since the Court had ruled in Hamdi that the AUMF
gave Congress's express approval to the President to use all
traditional and accepted incidents of force in the current military
conflict, including detaining American citizens captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan, it also gave its approval to the executive to
use warrantless electronic surveillance to intercept enemy
communications both at home and abroad. 97
A number of scholars and former government officials
responded that the AUMF could not reasonably be construed to
implicitly authorize warrantless electronic surveillance in the United
States during wartime because of the existence of FISA. 98 "The
DOJ... continues to place primary reliance on an argument that the
AUMF silently authorized what Congress had in FISA clearly and
specifically forbidden-unlimited warrantless wiretapping during
wartime." 99 In contrast to the situation considered in Hamdi,
legislation exists on this exact point: FISA expressly limits
authorization for warrantless surveillance to the first fifteen days after
war has been declared."° Since an AUMF is not even as formal as a
declaration of war, which would only authorize fifteen days of

95. Cole & Lederman, supra note 94, at 1374-75 (DOJ statement on January 19, 2006,
quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (reported as a note to 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2008)).
96. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
97. Cole & Lederman, supra note 94, at 1375.
98. David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National Security Agency's Domestic
Spying Program:January9, 2006 Letterfrom Scholars and Former Government Officials to
CongressionalLeadership in Response to Justice Department Letter of December 22, 2005,
81 IND. LJ. 1364, 1364 (2005); February2, 2006 Letterfrom Scholars,supra note 47, at1415.
99. February2, 2006 Letter from Scholars,supra note 47,at 1416.
100. 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2008).

Fall 20091

WARRANTLESS WIRETAPPING

warrantless wiretapping, to conclude that the AUMF provides the
President with unlimited and indefinite warrantless wiretapping
authority is entirely unreasonable. 1'
In addition, the scholars argued, to interpret the AUMF as
implicitly amending FISA would be "a momentous statutory
development, undoubtedly subject to serious legislative debate...
not the sort of thing Congress would enact inadvertently."' ° As the
Supreme Court recently noted, "Congress... does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes. 1 3
A critical difference between unlimited warrantless wiretapping
and Hamdi is that Congress had not specifically regulated detention
of American citizens during wartime, whereas electronic surveillance
targeting U.S. persons within the United States is the precise conduct
regulated by FISA.1° The DOJ's reading would require interpreting a
statute that is entirely silent on the subject to have implicitly repealed
and wholly overridden the carefully constructed and criminally
enforced "'exclusive means"' created by Congress for the regulation
of electronic surveillance.'
The Court's holding two years later in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
further refutes the DOJ's arguments that the AUMF authorized
warrantless wiretapping.' 6 In Hamdan, the Court held that the
military commissions the President established in 2001 transgressed
two statutory restrictions that Congress had enacted, Articles 21 and
36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"), which
required that military commissions comply with the international laws
of war and follow the rules applicable to courts-martial. 7 The Court
rejected the argument that the AUMF implicitly authorized the
President to implement military commissions where the UCMJ

101. Cole & Lederman, supra note 122, at 1416.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 921 (2006) (quoting Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
104. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1811).
105. Id. at 1416.
106. Curtis A. Bradley et al., Letter to Members of Congress, July 14, 2006, at 2,
available at: http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/pdf/lettertocongress7-14.pdf (in response
to Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Sen.
Charles Schumer (July 10, 2006), availableat http:/Alawculture.blogs.coml lawculture/files/
NSA.Hamdan.response.schumer.pdf (arguing that Hamdan does not apply)).
107. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786, 2790-93, 2804-08 (2006).
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establishment. ' 8

specifically provided procedures for
The Court held
9
that "[r]epeals by implication are not favored"' and explained in a
footnote that even where Congress has declared war, the President is
not authorized to do what pre-existing statutes forbid. " ° As with the
military commissions in Hamdan, nothing in the text or legislative
history of the AUMF suggests that Congress intended to expand or
alter the authorization of wiretapping set forth in FISA."'
Furthermore, FISA's limitations on electronic surveillance are
"crystal clear, and uncontroverted. ' 12 As Suzanne Spaulding, former
assistant general counsel at the CIA, articulated,
The law clearly states that the criminal wiretap statute and
FISA are 'the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance.., and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and
electronic communications may be conducted.'
If these
authorities are exclusive, there is no other legal authority that
can authorize warrantless surveillance."'

The DOJ's argument that the AUMF implicitly repealed a
Congressional statute specifically on point is simply preposterous.
A recent account of the Bush Administration suggests that the
DOJ's argument that the AUMF implicitly repealed existing
limitations on electronic surveillance was entirely post hoc and
calculated to maximize executive power." 4 According to U.S. District

Judge Royce C. Lamberth, chief of the federal government's special
surveillance court when the warrantless eavesdropping began, the
Bush administration had no interest in changing the law through
constitutional channels: "We could have gone to Congress, hat in

108. Id.
109. Id. at 2775 (citing ExparteYerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105 (1869)).

110. Bradley, supra note 106, at 3 (citing Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2775 n.24).
111.

Id. at 4.

112. Id.

113. Suzanne Spaulding, Power Play: Did Bush Roll Pastthe Legal Stop Signs? WASH.
POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at B1, availableat http:l/balkin.blogspot.coml2005/12/if-youre-going-

to-read-only-one-thing.html (Spaulding is former assistant general counsel at the CIA,
general counsel for the Senate and House Intelligence committees, and executive director
of the National Terrorism Commission (1999-2000)).
114. Barton Gellman, Cheney Shielded Bush From Crisis,WASH. POST, Sept.15, 2008;
at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/14/
AR2008091401974.html. See also JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY, THE
ULTRA-SECRET NSA FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 110 (2008), at
112-18; GLENN GREENWALD, A TRAGIC LEGACY 93 (2007), at 93-94.
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hand, the judicial branch and the executive together, and gotten any
statutory change we wanted in those days, I felt like. But they wanted
to demonstrate that the president's power was supreme."'" 5
In summary, the history and statutory language of FISA clearly
limit executive authority to conduct warrantless domestic wiretapping
and to argue that a general AUMF overrides specific provisions in
FISA completely perverts congressional intent.
11. The Terrorist Surveillance Program
Violated Fourth Amendment Rights
The TSP not only contravened FISA and the separation of
powers, but also violated the Fourth Amendment. 116 On March 2,
2009, the DOJ released an Office of Legal Counsel memo October 23,
2001, in which the Bush Administration concluded that "the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to domestic military operations,"
including "intercepting electronic or wireless communications" by
''employing surveillance methods more powerful and sophisticated
'
than those available to law enforcement agencies."117
This flies in the
face of the Constitution and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
has never upheld warrantless domestic
wiretapping for any purpose
8
and has struck it down many times."
Another view is that following September 11, the Bush
Administration believed that FISA required government officials to
certify that the sole or primary purpose of surveillance was to obtain
foreign intelligence, rather than obtain evidence for use in a criminal
enforcement action." 9 On this basis, the Administration pushed for
an amendment to this provision in the USA Patriot Act with the
intent of establishing FISA surveillance for use in a possible criminal
prosecution so long as some residual foreign intelligence purpose of

115. See Gellman, supra note 114.
116. See February2, 2006 Letter from Scholars,supra note 47, at 1422.
117. See Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the
United States, Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 4, 18, (2001), available at
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/03/doj-releases-bush-era-olc-memos.
118. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967) (holding that a New York statute authorizing electronic
surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532
(1967) (holding that a warrant was required regardless of the purpose of the search); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that Fourth Amendment's probable
cause and warrant requirements apply to electronic surveillance).
119. Funk, supra note 69, at 1100-02.
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the surveillance also existed. 2 ° The Patriot Act amendment to the
purpose requirement tended in the same direction as the TSP-it
reduced oversight and gave the government great latitude in
gathering domestic information-although it did not go as far as the
TSP.
A district court recently held in the Mayfield v. United States case
that FISA as amended by the Patriot Act violates Fourth
121
Amendment protections, suggesting that the far more egregious
TSP might also be found unconstitutional. In Mayfield, the court
examined claims by plaintiffs who alleged unlawful searches and
seizures, and unlawful arrest and imprisonment, after the FBI
concocted false and misleading affidavits in order to justify intrusive
searches and Brandon Mayfield's arrest as a material witness in the
Madrid commuter train bombings of 2004.122 The district court held
that the Patriot Act FISA amendments are unconstitutional because
they permit the government to perform covert physical searches and
electronic surveillance and wiretaps of the home, office and vehicles
of a person without first requiring the government to demonstrate to
a court (1) the existence of probable cause and (2) that the primary
purpose of the searches and surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information.' 23 In other words, the Patriot Act effectively
eliminates the probable cause requirement that FISA previously
relaxed only for national security intelligence gathering, allowing the
executive branch to bypass the Fourth Amendment in gathering
evidence for a criminal prosecution. 12 The district court held that
Keith should remain the guiding principle: the decision to conduct
electronic surveillance25 cannot be left to the discretion of law
enforcement officials.

120. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2008); Funk, supra note 69, at 1101 ("The immediate
aftermath of September 11, 2001 ... was not the best situation in which to consider calmly

either the necessity or all the ramifications of a change to the purpose requirement. ...
FISA now constitutes a system by which the government can intentionally subject a
person to the most wide-ranging and intrusive searches to obtain evidence of criminal
behavior for the purposes of using it in a criminal prosecution, absent the traditional
safeguards associated with searches for evidence of crimes.").
121.

Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1039 (D. Or. 2007) (on appeal).

122.

Id.

123. Id. at 1032.
124. Id. at 1037.
125.

Id. at 1038.
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So far, Mayfield stands alone and against other district courts
upholding the constitutionality of recent FISA amendments, 6 but
whether the TSP violated Fourth Amendment protections is still an
open question," 7 for in most cases plaintiffs have been denied
standing."
IV. Warrantless Domestic Wiretapping Fails To Achieve

Substantial Benefits to National Security
Not only was the TSP an unconstitutional executive act that
violates the public's Fourth Amendment rights, it also failed to
resolve intelligence problems.
The conventional wisdom after
September 11, 2001, was that U.S. national security agencies failed to
"connect the dots" before the attacks."9 In contrast, others saw a
more critical intelligence failure that there were "too few useful
dots."13 By circumventing FISA, however, the TSP solved neither of
these institutional problems.
The government defends the TSP with the argument that FISA
impeded intelligence work by creating a "wall" that restricted the
degree of cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence
collectors and limited the use of information in criminal
prosecutions."'3 Neither of these arguments explain the government's
failure to intervene in the September 11 terrorist attacks when the
NSA had conducted judicially authorized electronic surveillance since
1999 on two September 11 terrorists, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf
al-Hazmi, and had shared their identities with the CIA and FBI.'32

126. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D. Conn. 2008); United
States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Minn. 2008); United States v. Mubayyid, 521 F.
Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that FISA does not violate the Fourth
Amendment's judicial review, probable cause, particularity, and notice requirements).
127. Greenwald, supra note 20.
128. In re NSA Telcomms. Records Litigation is the only pending case. On January 5,
2009, plaintiffs survived the government's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. In re
NSA Telcomms. Records Litig., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (appeal denied).
See also ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 652-53 (6th Cir. 2007); David Krayets, Appeals
Court Allows Classified Evidence in Spy Case, WIRED BLOG NETWORK, February 27,
2009, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/02/appeals-court-a.html.
129. DYCUS,supra note 28 (quoting Robert Bryant et al., America Needs More Spies,
ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 30).
130. Id.
131. MUSCH, supra note 79,
132. Democracy Now!: James Bamford: The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA
from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America (Democracynow.org Internet broadcast Oct.
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Eliminating the requirement for court approval of electronic
surveillance would have done nothing to improve intelligence efforts
related to the September 11 terrorist attacks.133
The government's argument that FISA impeded effective
intelligence gathering is equally implausible. Passed in 1978, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act created a separate, secret court,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), to consider
warrant requests and ostensibly ensure a check on the activities of the
executive branch.1 34
All of the FISC's opinions and Justice
Department guidance documents are kept secret: The government is
not required to disclose the number of U.S. citizens who are subjected
to each type of FISA surveillance, where surveillance occurred, the
average length of surveillance and extensions, or the number of
targets subsequently arrested and convicted. 13 Regarding clandestine
physical searches, the government need not show any special need for
secrecy or give any notice; FISA permits secrecy that the Fourth
Amendment
clearly prohibits outside the intelligence-gathering
31 6
context.
The FISC has given virtually universal approval to the large
number of government requests for electronic surveillance: From
1997-2002, the government made between 749 and 1,228 applications
for electronic surveillance each year.3 7 The FISC approved every
single one. 38 After September 11, Congress passed the Patriot Act,
increasing the government's authority to collect and share wiretap
information between agencies and authorizing surveillance where the
purpose was not exclusively to gather foreign intelligence
information. 9 With the passage of the Patriot Act, government use
of FISA warrants exploded.' ° In short, before and after September

14, 2008), http://www.democracynow.org/2008/10/14/james-bamford
-the.
133. GREENWALD, supra note 114.
134. MUSCH, supra note 79, at vii.
135.

the-shadowjfactory

STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, RETHINKING THE PATRIOT ACT: KEEPING AMERICA

SAFE AND FREE 50 (2005).
136. Id. at 52.
137. MUSCH, supra note 79, at vii.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 205. See also ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT 2, 57 (2002).
140. SCHULHOFER, supra note 135, at 43. See also DYCuS, supra note 28, at 547 (In
2003, the FISC approved 1,724 warrants that represented an 85 percent increase from
2002, denied four, and made substantive modifications in seventy-nine others. In 2005, the
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11, 2001, the FISC allowed the President to do almost any
eavesdropping he wanted: the warrant requirement did not impede
effective or efficient intelligence gathering."'
Moreover, if the
executive found FISA to be impeding intelligence gathering, the
President could have gone to a very accommodating Congress to
amend the law to extend to the executive even greater eavesdropping
142
powers.
In addition to FISA not being restrictive enough to warrant
unlimited electronic surveillance, there is no clear basis that mass
electronic surveillance results in the production of substantive
intelligence and, specifically, has produced any tangible results in the
war on terrorism. 143 After the NSA began conducting warrantless
wiretapping, what the agency gained in speed and freedom, it
sacrificed in order and understanding.'"
In addition, of all the
terrorist prosecutions since September 11, the vast majority were
charged with "material support" to a group the government has
labeled terrorist under a very broad statute; the government has
obtained a number of convictions or guilty pleas, but none of the
defendants have been charged with engaging in terrorist activity.145
The only criminal conviction involving an actual terrorist incident
since September 11 was that of shoe bomber Richard Reid, captured
simply because an alert airline employee noticed him trying to light
his shoe on fire.16 Dragnet surveillance has failed to detect a terrorist
cell within the United States. 147 The results of electronic surveillance
are largely unknowable given its secret nature;148 but as far as the
public knows, warrantless domestic electronic surveillance has failed
to yield "useful dots"-substantive intelligence-or help the

government made 2,074 applications to the FISC, the government withdrew two
applications prior to a FISC ruling, and the FISC approved 2,072 applications.).
Additionally, for brief annual FISA reports, see http://www.usdoj.gov/oipr/readingroom/
2005fisa-ltr.pdf.
141. BAMFORD, supra note 114, at 110.
142. Greenwald, supra note 21. See also BAMFORD, supra note 114, at 300.
143. DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 232 (2006). See

also BAMFORD, supranote 114, at 121-23.
144. BAMFORD, supra note 114, at 122.
145. Id. at 233.
146. Id. at 234.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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government "connect the dots," while the risk to civil liberties is
enormous.
Extensive electronic surveillance produces a vast quantity of
information 4 ' and substantial risk of misuse of information. The
potential for abuse in the digital age far exceeds anything that was
possible in the era of paper records."' In Germany, constitutional
amendments passed in 1968 empowered the federal government to
bypass the court system and allow for the surveillance of the mail and
telecommunications when national security was said to be at issue."'
The information gathered was used by both the government and large
companies to block the hiring of anyone who had demonstrated
support for the radical left opposition as well as to initiate criminal
investigations designed to target dissent; by the 1980s, the practice of
electronic surveillance was said to have impacted as much as five
percent of the West German adult population 52 and probably had an
untold impact on chilling legal dissident behavior. Regarding the
ongoing collection and electronic storage of information gathered
through mass electronic surveillance here in the United States,
National Security Agency expert James Bamford says, "it isn't just
the picking up of these conversations and listening to them and
laughing about them. These conversations are transcribed.... and
then they're recorded, and they're kept forever" in an enormous
warehouse in Texas.'5 3 Once the NSA has the
information, there is no
154
telling what the government will do with it.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the TSP, and warrantless wiretapping in general,
fail to produce substantial benefit to intelligence work and
egregiously violate civil liberties. President Bush's authorization of

149. Id. at 322, 329, 340 ("With its secret intercept rooms, its sprawling data farms, and
its race for exaflop speeds, the NSA is akin to Jorge Luis Borges's 'Library of Babel,' a
place where the collection of information is both infinite and at the same time monstrous,
where the entire world's knowledge is stored, but not a single word understood.").
150. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 143, at 230. See also BAMFORD, supra note 114.
151. JAMES BECKMAN, COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES TO HOMELAND
SECURITY AND ANTI-TERRORIMS 94 (2007).
152. Id.
153. BAMFORD, supra note 114.
154. Presently, in addition to tracking where people are and what they are doing,
Bamford says that the NSA is "developing an artificial intelligence system designed to
figure out what people are thinking." Id. at 325.
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warrantless domestic wiretapping was invalid because the
Commander in Chief Clause did not give him authority to contravene
a legislative act; and furthermore, warrantless wiretapping is outside
the scope of actions fundamental to the incident of waging war.
President Obama's continued defense of warrantless wiretapping is,
similarly, an illegitimate exercise of executive power. The history and
statutory language of FISA clearly limit executive authority to
conduct
warrantless
domestic
wiretapping:
Warrantless
eavesdropping is a criminal offense-a felony. The AUMF cannot be
read to impliedly repeal FISA, and to read the AUMF otherwise
completely perverts congressional and judicial intent.
As the
Supreme Court held in Keith and as Congress legislated in FISA, the
decision to conduct electronic surveillance must not be left to the
discretion of law enforcement officials-to do so violates the Fourth
Amendment and eviscerates the separation of powers doctrine.
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